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| Our law firm has handled thousands of criminal cases with many hundreds being totally dismissed, criminal charges dealt with include amongst others Juvenile Law, Family Violence, Assault, Drug Charges, Theft, Shoplifting, Possession of Marijuana, Felonies, Misdemeanors, Failure to Stop and Give Information, Reckless Driving, Possession of a Controlled Substance, Possession of Cocaine, Motions to Revoke Probation or Deferred Adjudication, Burglary of a Building or Habitation, Runaway, Truancy, Vandalism. We have helped thousands of people get their cases dismisses, reduced, or kept off their records and we can help you. Please call today 713-697-4373 |
PENAL CODE
TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY
Sec. 6.01. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT OR OMISSION. (a) A person
commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act,
an omission, or possession.
(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or
receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a
sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.
(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless
a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or
otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993,
73rd Leg., ch. 3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec.
1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 6.02. REQUIREMENT OF CULPABILITY. (a) Except as provided in
Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the
definition of the offense requires.
(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state,
a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly
dispenses with any mental element.
(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state,
but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or
recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.
(d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from
highest to lowest, as follows:
(1) intentional;
(2) knowing;
(3) reckless;
(4) criminal negligence.
(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof
of the culpability charged.
(f) An offense defined by municipal ordinance or by order of a county
commissioners court may not dispense with the requirement of a culpable
mental state if the offense is punishable by a fine exceeding the amount
authorized by Section 12.23.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 2005, 79th
Leg., ch. 1219, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2005.
Sec. 6.03. DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES. (a) A person acts
intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in
the conduct or cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 6.04. CAUSATION: CONDUCT AND RESULTS. (a) A person is criminally
responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct,
operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the
concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct
of the actor clearly insufficient.
(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the
only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired,
contemplated, or risked is that:
(1) a different offense was committed; or
(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
TITLE 2. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
CHAPTER 6. CULPABILITY GENERALLY
Sec. 6.01. REQUIREMENT OF VOLUNTARY ACT OR OMISSION. (a) A person
commits an offense only if he voluntarily engages in conduct, including an act,
an omission, or possession.
(b) Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or
receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a
sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.
(c) A person who omits to perform an act does not commit an offense unless
a law as defined by Section 1.07 provides that the omission is an offense or
otherwise provides that he has a duty to perform the act.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1975, 64th Leg., p. 913, ch. 342, Sec. 3, eff. Sept. 1, 1975; Acts 1993,
73rd Leg., ch. 3, Sec. 1, eff. Feb. 25, 1993; Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec.
1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 6.02. REQUIREMENT OF CULPABILITY. (a) Except as provided in
Subsection (b), a person does not commit an offense unless he intentionally,
knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence engages in conduct as the
definition of the offense requires.
(b) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state,
a culpable mental state is nevertheless required unless the definition plainly
dispenses with any mental element.
(c) If the definition of an offense does not prescribe a culpable mental state,
but one is nevertheless required under Subsection (b), intent, knowledge, or
recklessness suffices to establish criminal responsibility.
(d) Culpable mental states are classified according to relative degrees, from
highest to lowest, as follows:
(1) intentional;
(2) knowing;
(3) reckless;
(4) criminal negligence.
(e) Proof of a higher degree of culpability than that charged constitutes proof
of the culpability charged.
(f) An offense defined by municipal ordinance or by order of a county
commissioners court may not dispense with the requirement of a culpable
mental state if the offense is punishable by a fine exceeding the amount
authorized by Section 12.23.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994; Acts 2005, 79th
Leg., ch. 1219, Sec. 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2005.
Sec. 6.03. DEFINITIONS OF CULPABLE MENTAL STATES. (a) A person acts
intentionally, or with intent, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in
the conduct or cause the result.
(b) A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of
his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of
the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. A person acts
knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he
is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.
(c) A person acts recklessly, or is reckless, with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard
of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as
viewed from the actor's standpoint.
(d) A person acts with criminal negligence, or is criminally negligent, with
respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct
when he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature
and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.
Sec. 6.04. CAUSATION: CONDUCT AND RESULTS. (a) A person is criminally
responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his conduct,
operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the
concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct
of the actor clearly insufficient.
(b) A person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the
only difference between what actually occurred and what he desired,
contemplated, or risked is that:
(1) a different offense was committed; or
(2) a different person or property was injured, harmed, or otherwise affected.
Acts 1973, 63rd Leg., p. 883, ch. 399, Sec. 1, eff. Jan. 1, 1974. Amended by
Acts 1993, 73rd Leg., ch. 900, Sec. 1.01, eff. Sept. 1, 1994.